

March 10, 1978

Mr. Ron Duhl
The Daily Californian
University of California
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Duhl,

In response to your expressed interest, I outline below my knowledge of earlier CIA academic relations with universities, and offer some comments on these matters.

My remarks are solely my own, not those either of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (where I have been a Professional Staff Member since June 1976), or of the CIA (which I left, on my own initiative, in June 1974). I have no past documents at hand: my knowledge of these matters is limited to my recollection; the Los Angeles Times article of February 19, 1978, by Narda Zacchino and Robert Scheer; and The Daily Californian issue of February 21, 1978, which you have sent me.

For four years, mid-1970 to mid-1974, I was the academic coordinator for the Directorate of Intelligence (the then research and analysis arm of the CIA). This was a part-time assignment; my principal duties at CIA at the time lay in directing the production of analytic studies on world political questions. My predecessor in the academic coordinator role, prior to mid-1970, had had similar dual duties, as did my successor, after mid-1974. In all, this academic effort was a modest, one-man operation, requiring about twenty percent of my time.

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As for CIA's relations with academia, I'm sorry I can't help you concerning the question of former U. C. Administrative Vice President Earl C. Bolton's relationships with the CIA. I never heard of him or the case prior to reading the above mentioned press accounts, and I have no basis for judging those accounts. Nor have I ever heard of CIA-funded studies at U. C., China Center or otherwise, except as stated in your article in The Daily Californian.

As for the CIA academic seminars, it is my understanding that they began to be held around the country about 1966, as part of a sudden awakening of the Washington intelligence community (the CIA, DIA, State Department's INR, and others) to the existence of an erratic, nuclear-armed China, and a subsequent bureaucratic crash effort to give China problems more relative attention than they had previously enjoyed. You will recall that by 1966, the Chinese had detonated their first atomic device and had begun to make fast initial strides in that field; the Chinese domestic scene had come to be dominated by the confusing Cultural Revolution; and the U. S. Government had intervened on a large scale in Vietnam, and understandably had great interest in neighboring China's likely policies and conduct. Events in China had contributed to the sudden massive buildup of Soviet armed forces along China's northern borders. One of the lesser ripples of these Chinese events was the decision by CIA to seek outside views in attempting to understand the very difficult pattern of political events going on in China. Hence the series of seminars with academia. During my incumbency as academic coordinator, a few years later, the seminars became less frequent, as the Cultural Revolution wound down in China and the U. S. began to extricate itself from the Vietnam war; and we began to hold a few seminars with academic experts on difficult analytical questions other than Chinese.

These occasional seminars, Chinese or otherwise, were held at various cities (San Francisco, Cambridge, New York, Chicago, Washington), professors being invited from universities in or near these respective centers of academic learning.

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There were no special relations with any particular university, U. C. or otherwise, and the seminars were held off campus. The seminars were overt: we the convenors were openly CIA. The seminars dealt only with unclassified information. No attempt was made to instill any CIA analytic "line;" rather, we were seeking outside interpretations as a check on our own Washington readings of foreign events. In fact, in some instances our own CIA seminar participants were in disagreement among themselves as to who was doing what to whom in Peking, Moscow, or wherever.

I continued the excellent policies set by my predecessor of trying to attract as broad a spectrum as possible from among our academic participants. At no time did we ever cease inviting a participant because of the particular views that participant held or expressed on any world question.

The academic participants in our seminars (generally 8-14 or so guests at a time, and an average of 2 to 3 seminars per year during my incumbency) did represent some of the country's best brains on foreign affairs questions. In a few cases other professors we invited turned us down, not wishing to participate in a CIA-sponsored enterprise, however benign its nature.

As for the mechanics of the seminars, the participants received only a dinner and expenses, but no honoraria during the time I was academic coordinator. Also, during my time no follow-up documents were prepared and later distributed to the participants.

The seminars varied in quality and stimulation, but on the whole were successful -- in the sense of mutual analytical benefit, the learning of new approaches, broader perspectives, etc. This was especially true because the problems under discussion were usually the most difficult analytical and estimative questions which exist for U. S. policymaking, those of understanding foreign political dynamics and policy intentions. The particular parts of the CIA which we bureaucrats represented were those research and analytic offices of CIA tasked with wrestling with these often unknowables of world events. Many of us were ourselves former academicians, we all considered ourselves essentially

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scholars, and the analytical questions at hand were often similar or identical to those on which the country's best academicians were working and writing.

CIA did mail a number of "documents" to participants from time to time. These were in all cases unclassified materials, and consisted of maps, lists of foreign leaders, economic statistics, etc. These documents were made available not only to seminar participants, but to a larger number of other scholars around the country, as well as to still other scholars and graduate students who wrote CIA requesting these documents. [REDACTED] documents had to do with

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my understanding that since my time at CIA, the number of unclassified materials being made public has expanded; and that they are now being made available through the Library of Congress, rather than by direct mailings -- if so, a process I personally think a better one.

That about exhausts my knowledge of the facts of the CIA relations with academia. While I'm at it, however, I'll add a few personal comments concerning these matters.

I do not consider myself a CIA apologist. Upon leaving the Agency, I did a fair amount of writing and public speaking (including to the San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations, January 1975), questioning the wisdom of CIA covert activities, and calling for much fuller and stricter congressional oversight of the U. S. intelligence community. I was a full-time Consultant to the Senate's "Church" Committee, and more recently a staff member of its successor, the (Inouye and now the Birch Bayh) Select Committee on Intelligence. In those committees I have participated in numerous inquiries which concern past abuses and foolishnesses on the part of the CIA, other parts of the government, and (not least) U. S. Administrations themselves -- Republican and Democratic alike. Our oversight function also involves, however, numerous efforts to help strengthen and improve U. S. intelligence. This includes considerable work concerning intelligence collection, production, and quality. This is the area of my own principal concern within the committee staff, and one which fits my past experience and my views as to how the U. S. public can be more confident that their tax dollars are not going to intelligence production overkill, or to poor or slanted intelligence.

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I continue to feel strongly that good analysis is what intelligence is basically all about and all for: to give U. S. Administrations as accurate and objective a picture of the world as is possible, so that policymakers can act more wisely with respect to the world that is, not one they imagine. Hence there is a need for continuing and improving the research and analysis arms of CIA, whose judgmental batting records over the years have been fairly good. There have been some notable exceptions, but there has been a good record in maintaining objectivity and independence of view. (As an example, see the Pentagon Papers treatment of CIA's 1964 analytical acuity, if not enthusiasm, regarding escalating the Vietnam war.) One of the best ways to maintain and strengthen an independent analytical capability remains that of seeking the views of the country's best experts in academia. The goals: to present top U. S. policymakers with the best analytic judgments possible, and -- often lacking in the past -- to make such impact on those policymakers that they will reexamine their own privately held preconceptions.

Thus I consider that the earlier seminars with academia were part of a legitimate effort, and that overt U. S. Government-academic intercourse on analytical problems will continue to be a needed and legitimate effort -- whatever the particular form those relationships take: seminars, consultants, CIA officers at graduate schools, university professors on sabbaticals at CIA, or whatever. In my view the only CIA relationships with colleges and universities should be overt, and I feel lines are a good and needed thing.

The Harvard Guide -

I see nothing sinister in CIA analysts attending graduate schools, as long as they are clearly identified as CIA and are there wholly in the pursuit of academic study. Like the U. S. military services and the Foreign Service, a few CIA analysts have for some years attended the National War College, the service war colleges, the State Department's Senior Seminar, and various of the country's best graduate schools. Some of these officers have finished M.A.'s or Ph.D.'s in the process; others have gathered data for books or articles; still others (as in my own case) have been postdoctoral scholars, digging into open materials on various especially elusive or difficult subjects.

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All in all, the questions your articles raise concerning the CIA and U. S. go to the heart of the phenomenon of CIA and academia. In doing so, these questions illustrate the fact that there have in effect always been two CIA's: one covert and clandestine, the other scholarly and procedurally overt. The seminars, etc., were part of the latter. Yet because their officers wore the same CIA uniform, as did I at the time, suspicions naturally and understandably have arisen. This difficult and perennial problem can perhaps be solved within present intelligence community structures by greater CIA candor, openness, etc. Another solution which has been offered by various observers would be to take research and analysis out of the CIA altogether and place it at a national, overt level, opening it up to more scholars from inside and outside government, and removing such functions from existing suspicions and stigma concerning CIA.

In any event, your articles discuss legitimate questions. The Los Angeles Times' account, however, places a ~~dark~~ *dark* connotation on CIA-U. S. relationships which to my knowledge is unwarranted.

I hope this letter is responsive to your interests, although there may not be much of a story here for you.

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